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Introduction and Context
The post-World War One international order gave strong emphasis to notions of ethnic
self- determination espoused by both Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin. This would lead to
major reforms in understandings of international relations, such as the eclipse of the empire by
the nation-state as the primary political unit. These changes emboldened movements of
colonized people in asserting their freedom and claiming a physical state for their ethnic nation.
These challenges to the old order of strong imperialist states asserting their control over
their backwards colonial subjects would create problems for many imperialist powers, including
the Empire of Japan. Despite its relatively recent introduction to the industrial era and imperial
enterprise, Japan rose quickly in global prestige through the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895,
defeating and overtaking China; the historically dominant force in East Asia. Japan continued to
challenge racial stereotypes applied by the West, and had asserted themselves as a world power
to be reckoned with after their victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.
Despite its rapid ascendency, however, the new post-World War One order and its
alleged condemnation of imperialism would cut short Japan’s imperial ambitions. In response to
these changes, pan-Asian and anti-West rhetoric came to be used frequently in justifying the
Empire’s actions. Early pan-Asian thinkers in Japan, such as Kodera Kenkichi, who helped
popularize the discourse in Japanese politics in the 1910s, also feared a confrontation between
Asia and the West. Within Japan, Kodera emphasized closer Sino-Japanese ties as a means to
create a united front against further Western incursions into East Asia. Although it was
seemingly a defensive position from which Japan sought to establish closer ties with China, the
rhetoric used revealed certain caveats to pan-Asianism as understood by Japan. Kodera referred
to Japan as the “strongest nation among the yellow race,” while referring to China as “backward”
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and their lack of modernization as a “disease” that could only be cured with Japanese help. He
justified Japanese interest and interference with Chinese affairs by claiming that the stability of
China was pertinent to Japanese security.1 While urging cooperation with China, Kodera’s
language made it clear that he meant for Japan to lead Asia and was of the opinion that China
lacked the ability to organize itself effectively against Western imperialism.
Following the publishing of Kodera’s seminal Treatise on Greater Asianism in 1916, his
views on what Japan’s relationship to East Asia should be became mainstream. Although panAsianism took many forms and had several debates raging on within its discourse at any given
time, Kodera’s call for an Asian alliance, led by Japan, is visible in much of pan-Asian literature.
While never formally adopted as a policy by the Japanese government, the greater opportunities
for expansion presented by this discourse led future imperial gains to be justified along these
pro-Asian, anti-Western ideals.2
One area where this ideological shifts become visible is in Japanese expansion into the
region of Manchuria located in Northeastern China.3 Beginning in 1905 with the acquisition of it
as a protectorate, Japan began its expansion in the area by making claims on behalf of the
Koreans. This process, and the kinds of claims being made, would intensify following the
annexation of Korea into the Japanese Empire in 1910. The strategy of gradual expansion
through their Korean subjects was, however, replaced with outright invasion by the Japanese
Kwantung Army in 1931. The result of the invasion (which was launched without the permission

1

Sven Saaler. "The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan: Kodera Kenkichi and His ‘Treatise on Greater
Asianism’ (1916)." Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 6 (2007): 1276-77.
2
Saaler,”Construction of Regionalism in Japan,” 1276-77.
3
A note on terminology: “Manchuria” refers to the geographic region known as Manchuria which consists of what
could be called modern Northeast China. “Manchukuo” refers to the nation-state and its political borders as they
existed from 1932 until 1945. When the term “Manchurian” is used however, it could refer to either to the
geographic region or the political entity depending on context.
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of the Japanese home government), precipitated the establishment of the “independent state” of
Manchukuo. It claimed to emerge from alleged co-operation between Japanese forces and
Manchu nationalists pursuing national self-determination, following the collapse of the Manchuruled Chinese Qing Dynasty in 1912.
Manchukuo was founded in 1932 and would be superficially presided over from 1934 by
the former and final emperor of Qing China, Puyi. The region was in fact the homeland of the
Manchu ethnicity who had conquered and established their dynasty over China in 1644. Emperor
Puyi declared that his state would have “no discrimination with respect either to race or creed.”4
Its state motto of “Harmony between the Five Races (Han Chinese, Manchu, Mongols, Koreans,
and Japanese)”5 reflected ideas from the pan-Asian rhetoric that had existed for the past decades.
As a member of the minority Manchu ethnic group that had ruled over China during its final
dynasty, Emperor Puyi claimed to represent Manchu, and more broadly, pan-Asian interests in
his role as the nominal leader of Manchukuo. An investigation group known as the Lytton
Commission (after its head investigator) was dispatched by the League of Nations to gather
information on the Japanese invasion and the legitimacy of the new state. Citing Japan’s role in

4

Rosalia Avila-Tapies. “Co-Ethnic Spatial Concentrations and Japan's 1930s Concord Project for
Manchukuo.” Geographical Review of Japan Series B 88, no. 2 (2016): 49.
5
It should be pointed out that there is some contention over which ethnicities formed the Five Races. Alternative
to the five presented above, there is evidence to suggest a line-up that included Russians but not Han Chinese
(Tamanoi, 253). The logic of this is two-fold: by including Russians, Japanese could demonstrate Manchukuo’s
toleration to Westerners and Christianity in attempt to have the West look favorably on the puppet-state.
Furthermore, rather than being removed, the Han Chinese were instead counted as Manchurian (満人) in order to
inflate the appearance of Manchurians in Manchukuo (Han Chinese made up 90% of Manchukuo’s population)
(Lytton, 25). This version of the Five Races is corroborated through the Japanese document recognizing
Manchukuo that asked all references to Han Chinese (漢人) be replaced with Manchurian (Dubois, 758). For the
sake of this paper, however, I have chosen the version I have for a few reasons. In Manchukuo, Russians were
given relative autonomy in forming their own legal systems, meanwhile, much more policy is aimed at
standardizing laws for the version of the Five Races used in the thesis. Furthermore, in the rich graphic archive of
Manchurian postcards and propaganda posters depicting the principle of Racial Harmony (五族協和), the
individuals on the posters meant to represent the races of Manchukuo regularly feature distinguishable Han and
Manchu characters while Russians were seldom seen. While there was Manchurian propaganda highlighting its
Russian residents, they were rarely connected to the racial harmony ideology beyond a superficial level.
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initiating the invasion into the region, and the majority Japanese cabinet within Manchukuo’s
government, the Commission declared Manchukuo a Japanese puppet-state.6 In response to
Japanese claims of supporting Manchu self-determination, the Lytton Report further commented
that Manchuria was “unalterably [Han] Chinese” as a result of the centuries of Han Chinese
movement and influence into the Qing lands and administration.7 This findings would result in
Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations the same year.
The establishment of Manchukuo presented a hope for a pan-Asian state that would
exemplify the best traits of the diverse region’s respective cultures. Manchukuo, along with the
Japanese pan-Asian discourse that governed it, instead featured the same condescending attitude
held by the Japanese towards the rest of East Asia. Kodera’s vision of Japan as leader of an
otherwise lost cause had been widely disseminated. The Japanese administrators in Manchukuo
helped to bring legitimacy to this attitude through the implementation of Manchukuo’s secondary
slogan, Ōdō Rakudo (王道楽土), or “The Kingly Way.” The slogan is primarily accredited to
Zheng Xiauxu, a Puyi loyalists and the first Prime Minister of Manchukuo. It was meant to mix
notions of Confucian polity with mechanisms of the modern nation-state.8 This slogan brought
forth images of a proper Confucian state and helped to justify social stratification occurring
under Japanese rule through features like “proper place.” It also, however, was meant to appeal
to pan-Asian sentiments by demonstrating respect for what appeared to be a traditional Chinese
model of ruling.

6

Edward R. Bulwer-Lytton. “Report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry” (League of Nations, Geneva, 1932).
Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2004), 41.
8
Thomas David Dubois, “Rule of Law in a Brave New Empire: Legal Rhetoric and Practice in Manchukuo,” Law and
History Review 26, no. 2 (2008): 293. doi:10.1017/S0738248000001322.
7
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This thesis will explore the role of the contradictions between Japanese pan-Asian
rhetoric and imperial policy regarding Japanese activity in Manchukuo. Further explored will be
the ramifications of the continued disregard by Japan for the new international norms, especially
as pertains to its pan-Asian project, Manchukuo. The treaties examined were signed prior to the
1931 invasion and are indicative of the kinds of practices through which Japan enacted
diplomacy before the post-World War One system. Through the use of vague terms and broad
interpretations of what are now seen as cornerstones of the modern nation-state, borders and
citizenship, Japan paid little heed to the trivialities of statehood in order to achieve imperial
expansion. In Manchukuo, the Japanese would be unsuccessful in harmonizing their rhetoric and
their actions and consequently failed to convince many observers both inside and outside of the
Empire that Manchukuo was a legitimate state. In particular, the unsuccessful attempts at
establishing something resembling a Manchurian nationality law reveals how Manchukuo
struggled to appear legitimate while continuing policies favoring Japanese subjects.
Examining this narrative through a Korean lens is useful for a number of reasons. The
treaties examined concerning disputes between Japan and China regarding Manchukuo are either
directly concerning Korean interests or used to pursue them in order to expand into the region.
After 1932, it was concerns related to Korean subjects that hindered nationality reform and
ultimately prevented the passage of a Manchurian nationality law. Lastly, throughout this
narrative, Koreans exist in a unique position from which to further understand the contradictions
present in the Japanese Empire. Since the 1920’s Koreans were subject to harsh “cultural rule”
which aimed to replace traditional Korean ways with that of Japan in order to better assimilate
the Koreans into the Empire. These policies included banning the use of the Korean language
while enforcing Japanese language education, and forcing Koreans to participate in Japanese
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religious ceremonies. In Manchuria, however, Koreans, as Japanese subjects, had access to better
material resources and security relative to their Chinese and Manchu neighbors. This bred
animosity between Koreans and local Chinese who began to think of the Koreans as the
henchmen of the Japanese. The Korean perspective is useful in that it offers a view from within
the Empire that is simultaneously privileged and oppressed through its status as a Japanese
subject.
Historiography
The intellectual framework for this thesis primarily concerns issues that arise via the
interplay of citizenship and identity. In understanding this phenomena, two works stand out in
their influence on the paper. Imagined Communities by Benedict Anderson is known for the
introduction of its titular concept in understanding the formation of the modern nation-state.
Anderson argues that the spread of writings in the vernacular and the development of print
capitalism such as newspapers led the modern-nation state to be thought of as an “imagined
community,” held together through language and mass communication. Although Anderson’s
work largely overlooks East Asia, it nonetheless provided and interesting framework; notions of
this “imagined community” can be seen in the use of pan-Asian rhetoric to legitimize the
Japanese Empire.
Attempting to establish a proper framework for examining the Empire-building attempt
by the Japanese, Eiji Oguma’s A Genealogy of Japanese Self-Images has been instrumental.
Oguma charts the different discourses on Japanese identity that were present in Imperial Japan
and helps to understand how Empire changed Japanese racial discourse. As the Empire widened,
it began to incorporate more non-ethnic Japanese peoples into the category of Japanese subject.
At home, racial rhetoric began to adopt pan-Asian ideas to widen who would be thought of as
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“Japanese” while simultaneously engraining negative stereotypes held by the Japanese towards
their non-Japanese subjects into their acceptance of new colonized peoples.
Louise Young’s Japan’s Total Empire provided as a useful means to understand the
larger narrative of Manchukuo and its ties to Japan. Not only does it provide a comprehensive
political history of Manchukuo, but its thesis is focused on the perception of Manchukuo in the
Japanese popular imagination. The string of victories by the Japanese military and increased
nationalism resulted in Manchukuo becoming quite popular in Japan as propaganda sought to
establish ties between Japan and Manchuria by framing the latter as a lifeline for the former. By
providing a Japanese-centric narrative on Manchukuo, Young’s work helped to better understand
Manchukuo as a puppet-state.
Concerning Koreans in Manchuria Two Dreams in One Bed, by Hyun Ok Park explores
the Korean experience of economic exploitation by the Japanese through development
companies. Paying special attention to Koreans in Kando, Park used “territorial osmosis” to
describe the encroachment into Manchuria by the Japanese through the Koreans. Her work also
highlights the dispossession of Koreans from their land in Korea for the benefit of incoming
Japanese farmers, a notable concern at the time. Although the scholarship focusing on the
Korean experience, specifically Kando, is limited, a detailed analysis provides insight in the
contradictory nature of Japanese Imperialism.
Lastly, in understanding the legal debates going on during the time written about, The
Lytton Report and the Report on the Korean Problem in Manchuria (a study done as part of the
Lytton Commission) also served foundational texts in understanding the situation in Manchuria.
The Lytton Report was undertaken to investigate the Mukden Incident, a staged bombing by the
Japanese to justify their invasion into Manchuria. The report on Koreans was undertaken as one
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of many studies of the Lytton investigation. Both reports succinctly summarize the situation that
developed in Manchuria and provide in-depth information on Chinese and Japanese claims and
the role of Koreans in the region. Additionally, they examine the treaties and laws passed by the
nations concerned in managing the increasingly tense situation. The information contained in the
two reports on the territorial claims of the two powers are as central to understanding the
situation now as they were when they were published.
By examining the experience of the Koreans in Manchukuo and the laws and treaties
affecting them through a larger global context and changing international norms, the thesis will
demonstrate how this changes presented themselves in law. By understanding the kinds of legal
and logical hoops through which the Japanese had to jump in order to preserve their expanding
empire, one gains insight into the disorderly manner through which Manchukuo was governed.
This is important in understanding Japanese imperialism as it reveals some of the less noticeable
pressures that bureaucrats and legislatures felt at this time. As the war situation worsened and
Japan sought to take advantage of all available resources they began to grant their non-Japanese
subjects something resembling citizenship. The subjects would acquire more rights and as well
as obligations, including conscription. This process was hindered, however, by the legal knot that
Japan had to untie in discerning the kinds of rights that could be safely given to resentful
subjects.
Korea and Manchuria
When discussing Kando (Jiando in Chinese), it is important to first ask whose Kando is
being examined. While it is correct to assert that Kando is a region above Korea known for its
high number of Koreans living there, extensive research by this historian has failed to produce
concrete borders for the region that are agreed upon by the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. For
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example, the Korean Goguryeo Dynasty (37BCE-668AD), which stretched beyond the Korean
peninsula and into Manchuria (including Kando) made it an ancestral home to some Koreans,
while other families remained in the region for centuries. This legacy appears in Korean exile
and immigrant literature in Manchuria during the early 20th century which frequently used
‘Kando’ and ‘Manchuria’ interchangeably despite obvious geographic problems with that.9
Today, the region known as Kando still exists as part of China but has become the
Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. The area continues to support a prevalent (if shrinking)
Korean presence. It is important to note however, that the modern borders of the prefecture were
largely the result of the Kando Treaty, agreed upon by the governments of the Chinese Republic
and the Japanese Empire. Perhaps a better estimate of the natural border of the region would be
the East Manchurian Mountains, since over half of the Korean immigrants had settled between
the Korean border and the mountains by 1929. There they made up around two-thirds of the
regional population, making up 395,847 of Kando’s 518,752 people in 1931.10
There doesn’t appear to be an accurate estimate of the population of Manchuria and
Kando before Manchukuo was established in 1932. Despite estimates made by both China and
Japan, a truly accurate population count for Manchuria—especially for Koreans in the region—
was difficult. Koreans in Manchuria were often counted incorrectly which resulted in inaccurate
numbers that underrepresented the actual Korean population. These inaccuracies were the result
of several factors, such as Korean families who had been established in the region for centuries
as well as those who responded to an invitations from the Qing to immigrate since the 1870s.
These families did not consider themselves immigrants and those who had already gone so far as

9

Um Hae-Kyung, "Listening Patterns and Identity of the Korean Diaspora in the Former USSR," British Journal of
Ethnomusicology 9, no. 2 (2000): 121.
10
Lee, “Korean Migrants in Manchuria,” 201.
Young, “Annex III” Korean Problems in Manchuria.
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to become naturalized Chinese subjects made classification that much more difficult.
Furthermore, the occasional unwillingness of Koreans to accurately report their nationality to
Japanese officials in order to avoid further interference by Japanese authorities affected the
accuracy of regional censuses.
Japanese estimates tended to understate the number of Koreans who lived in Manchuria
prior to the establishment of Manchukuo, while Chinese estimates tended to overstate them. A
report issued concurrently with the Lytton Report estimated the Korean population in Manchuria
was between 800,000 and 1,000,000 (3% of the total population of the area), with at least
400,000 in Kando in 1932.11 They were primarily rice farmers seeking more affordable land in
Manchuria. Only about 40,000 (5%) of Korean immigrants lived in cities by 1932.12 Both the
city-dwelling and rural Korean experiences in Manchukuo are accounted for as each perspective
offers insight into the different opportunities and struggles of the Koreans within the region.
The two main waves of Korean immigration into Manchuria explored here took place
between the 1870s-1890s and the years following Korea’s annexation by Japan 1910. The first
wave of immigrants crossed into Manchuria to escape a famine in Korea. To Koreans,
Manchuria was seen not only as a kind of ancestral, but as an untapped frontier land offering
many opportunities. This latter image was the result of Manchu attempts to curb immigration
into their homeland prior to the 1870s. This created the impression of an unpopulated expanse of
Manchuria as untouched land.
The later wave of immigrants started as Japan began to increasingly interfere with
Korean affairs during the end of the 19th and start of the 20th century. This interference continued

11

Carl W. Young. “Korean Problems in Manchuria as Factors in the Sino-Japanese Dispute,” Supplementary
Documents to the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Study No. 9 (Geneva: 1932), 6.
12
Hoon K. Lee, “Korean Migrants in Manchuria,” Geographical Review 22, no. 2, (1932): 201.
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beyond annexation as Japanese modernization efforts in Korea made living there unaffordable
for the lower classes. Meanwhile, Japan funded Korean immigration into Manchuria through
high-interest loans and promises of land ownership given by the state-owned Oriental
Development Company. The second wave included significant numbers of anti-Japanese radicals
and ultimately helped make up the Korean Communist movement in Manchuria. After 1932,
Koreans would make up 90% of the communists in Manchukuo. Despite their zeal, however,
their intense focus on freedom for Korea led to their shunning by the Chinese Communists for
placing national interests over class interests.13
The Kando Treaty
In 1904, a formal agreement was signed between Qing China and the short-lived but
independent Empire of Korea (1897-1910) that granted Korean immigrants the right to own land
and pay taxes to the Kando administration.14 Under the treaty, land ownership could only occur
after a Korean immigrant became a naturalized Chinese citizen. In Kando, Koreans were
required to pay Chinese taxes and were placed under the jurisdiction of Chinese officials. The
Qing also pursued a policy of assimilation that sought to culturally integrate the Koreans into
China. The assimilation policies resulted in 10-15% of the Koreans adopting Chinese nationality
and assimilating. In exchange for adopting Chinese nationality, the immigrants were then
exempted from certain taxes and could receive better access to social services provided to them
through their local government. The majority, who did not naturalize, mostly became tenant
farmers who leased land from Chinese landlords. These people tended to receive from the
Chinese, worse treatment and worse quality of land to cultivate relative to those that

13

Hyun Ok Park, Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in
Manchuria (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005): 208, 219.
14
Park, Two Dreams in One Bed, 98.
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naturalized.15 To the Chinese, the Koreans entering Manchuria at the start of the 20th century
were seen simultaneously as unfortunate refugees fleeing Imperial Japan as well an economic
asset. This attitude changed after Japan annexed Korea and began seeking ways to push into
Manchuria.
The Kando Treaty, signed in 1909, was an agreement between China and Japan (acting
on the interests of its protectorate, Korea) that seceded the territorial and administrative rights of
the Kando region to the Chinese. The treaty was undertaken after several years of territorial
disputes between the two parties, following Korea becoming a Japanese protectorate in 1905.
The Japanese had feuded with the Chinese over land ownership, citing the majority Korean
population as a reason to secede the territory to Korea. This would benefit not only the Koreans
but the Japanese as well who would gain a foothold in Manchuria through their status as
protector of Korea. The treaty continued the terms of the original agreement that had allowed
Koreans to settle and work in Kando during the 1890s. It also, however, gave Japan the right to
station police in Kando to guarantee the safety of the Japanese consulate and secure safe trade in
larger cities.16 Ultimately, the treaty could only temporarily solve this issue, which again became
problematic following the signing of the 1915 Treaty between Japan and China.
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Ibid, 97.
Hyun Ok Park, "Korean Manchuria: The Racial Politics of Territorial Osmosis," The South Atlantic Quarterly 99,
no. 1 (2000): 207.
16

13

Part of a political map of Manchukuo. The L-shaped area northeast of Korea (which has been
labeled 日本) is the ministry of Kando (間島) as it existed in Manchukuo from 1932-1945.17

17

“Manshūkoku – Kantōshū,” Maps Of, Maps Of, mapsof.net.
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The agreed upon border of Kando according to the Kando Treaty (1909). One can see that it
appears to have grown in size upon becoming part of Manchukuo.18
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Empire of Japan, “Pact Between Japan and China regarding Kando,” 4 September, 1909. C33. Japan Center for
Asian Historical Records.
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The 1915 Treaty and the Problem of Nationality
The Treaty and Notes Concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia
(hereafter referred to as the 1915 Treaty), gave “Japanese subjects” expanded rights to lease land,
travel freely, pursue business interests, and granted legal extraterritoriality in South Manchuria.19
The controversy over the terms of this treaty resulted from three factors: the Japanese definition
of “South Manchuria,” the status of nationality for the Koreans in South Manchuria, and
conflicting Chinese and Japanese interpretations of the treaty. To Chinese authorities, the region
known as Manchuria was (and still is) known as Dongbei Sansheng, “three northeastern
provinces,” one of which included the region of Kando. By referring to the region in the treaty as
South Manchuria, Japan ignored the already defined Chinese provincial system and instead
resorted to a vague geographic interpretation. Through these terms, Japan claimed wider
jurisdiction for their interpretation of the 1915 Treaty. The Chinese objected to Japanese claims,
maintaining that Kando didn’t fall into “South Manchuria” as that term lacked any true
meaning.20
For Koreans in Kando, the Chinese requirement to naturalize before one could own land
was often circumvented by non-naturalized Koreans registering land through Chinese authorities
under the names of family members who had already naturalized. Alternatively, some nonnaturalized Koreans paid officials who sought to increase their bottom line for temporary
citizenship.21 The official nationality of the Koreans, however, truly became a serious point of
diplomatic contention between Japan and China following the ratification of the 1915 Treaty.

19

"Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia." The American Journal of International Law 10,
no. 1 (1916): 5-7.
20
Lytton, Lytton Report, 57.
21
Ibid, 56.
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Following the annexation of Korea, Japan claimed that all Koreans were now Japanese
subjects. Accordingly, Imperial Japan argued that the provisions of extraterritoriality in the 1915
Treaty should be extended to all Japanese subjects, including Koreans in Manchuria since they
had been Japanese subjects since 1910. The use of “subject” here should be made distinct from
the term “citizen.” Koreans, although subjects of the Japanese Empire, were not fully
incorporated citizens who possessed the same rights as Japanese citizens. This distinction
between subject and citizen is also important in understanding how Imperial Japanese notions of
the Emperor’s sovereignty conflicted with more modern conceptions of the state as the ultimate
political body. These conflicting approaches to statehood and sovereignty are especially
prevalent themes when studying Manchukuo as well, as Japan was able to apply these culturally
loaded notions of sovereignty outside of Japan.
Japanese racial discourse began to react to its new subjects’ status in the Japanese social
order. During its ascent to world power status, Japan had been competing against Western
nations whose racial prejudices handicapped Japan’s growth. This being Japan’s introduction
into the international system of the time, Japan applied similar treatment towards its East Asian
neighbors. Borrowing from their experience with Westerners, the Japanese used patronizing
language comparable to the ‘white man’s burden’ as part of their justification for expanding their
territorial claims throughout East Asia. The right to vote, military service, and other liberties
were kept from and only gradually granted to Koreans as they were perceived to have obtained a
greater level of assimilation in Japanese society. 22 Assimilation was conflated with 20th century
ideals of what constituted a modern identity and equated becoming Japanese to modernization.

22

Iyenaga Toyokichi, "Japan's Annexation of Korea," The Journal of Race Development 3, no. 2 (1912): 221.
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During the 1920s and 1930s, theories within Japanese racial discourse would later be
implemented in colonial Korea. These policies included forcing Koreans to adopt Japanese
names and enforcing Japanese language education.23 Despite the gradual granting of rights to
Koreans, they were kept administratively distinct from the Japanese through separate family
registration records, koseki (戸籍).24 This dual system addressed the gap between citizen and
subject and created distance between Japanese and non-Japanese subjects. The question of how
to best assimilate the Koreans into Japan not only resulted in problems within the Empire but in
Manchukuo as well. The Japanese also had to consider the nationality of their subjects who
would immigrate to Manchukuo and were afflicted with fears of anti-Japanese sentiment held by
their Korean subjects. Simultaneously, questions of nationality worried the Japanese in
Manchukuo who coveted their extraterritorial privileges
The 1915 Treaty made provisions for Japanese subjects. The Japanese government
maintained that the annexation of Korean superseded any prior treaties and that the provisions of
the 1915 Treaty should extend to all Japanese subjects, not just the native Japanese as the
Chinese had intended. The Chinese government maintained that Korean rights were already clear
under their 1904 agreement with independent Korea whose terms had been reinforced with the
Kando treaty. They further held that this new treated did not augment or nullify any previous
agreements made before Korea’s annexation. The 1915 Treaty itself did, in fact, contain a clause
that addressed the subject of conflicting treaties stating that “All existing treaties between China
and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this treaty, remain

23

Oguma Eiji, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-Images, (Victoria: Trans Pacific, 2002): 140.
Katō Kiyofumi and Mitsunaga Tabata, and Mitsuhiro Matsushige. “Manshū no 「Kokumin」to wa Dare datta no
ka” Chōsensuru Manshū kenkyū : chiiki, minzoku, jikan. Tō kyō -to: Kabushiki kaisha Tō hō Shoten, 2015.
24
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in force,” however, Korean rights in Manchuria has been negotiated between the Empire of
Korea and the Qing Empire, not the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China.25
The status of the Koreans who had immigrated to China during the 1890’s, some of
whom had already naturalized as Chinese citizens became another post-annexation problem.
When these Koreans initially entered China, it was under Chinese provisions that they
immigrated and naturalized. According to two Chinese nationality laws passed in 1914 and 1929,
one of the conditions necessary to gain Chinese citizenship was permission from one’s home
country; additionally, individuals were not required to forfeit their previous nationality upon
becoming a Chinese citizen.26 Under Japan’s nationality law, naturalization in another nation
forfeited one’s right to Japanese citizenship and dual citizenship was not allowed. However, an
exception was made for the Koreans whereby they could naturalize without losing their status as
Japanese subjects. With this, Koreans could become Chinese citizens with the right to own
Chinese land while maintaining their place in the Empire. This new rule (where Japanese
authorities could enforce it) would be applied to all Koreans living in Manchuria.27
The 1915 Treaty in Effect
Despite the presence of Chinese assimilation policies aimed at the Koreans, most
immigrated and lived in Manchuria relatively undisturbed without naturalizing. The 1915 Treaty
and the subsequent arguing between Japan and China, however, destabilized the status of
Koreans in Manchuria. Japan had begun its process of “territorial osmosis” through their Korean
subjects. This process of acquiring land was accomplished through Japanese loans given to
Koreans to purchase land. These loans, however, included high interest rates that were difficult
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to repay and collected taxes on a flat rate rather than a as a percentage of actual crop yield. When
Korean farmers defaulted on their payments, the Japanese state would seize the Chinese land.28
This practice displaced Koreans while creating a demand for more loans.
While China and Japan agreed that Japanese subjects would have the right to lease land
in China, their disagreements stemmed from Japan claiming sovereignty over both the land and
the lessee as part of the Japanese Empire. They further maintained that leaseholders could sell
the land as they saw fit while the Chinese argued for a more orthodox implementation of leasing.
During the settlement of the 1915 Treaty, China failed to obtain the unanimous power to settle
land cases. As a result, both Chinese and Japanese officials served as judges and through
Japanese legal influence, a high number of cases were settled in favor of Japanese subjects.29
Responding to these developments, China began adopting harsher policies toward the Koreans
who leased the land.
Once seen as victims of Japanese expansionism, under these new aggressive policies,
Korean schools in Manchuria were closed and students were instead sent to mixed schools where
Chinese culture and language took precedence. Korean associations, meant to provide aid and
farming tools to Koreans, were attacked and prevented from accepting new members or
collecting membership dues.30 As a consequence of this persecution, Koreans were driven to rely
on the Japanese for protection and support. The Wanpaoshan Incident in 1931 occurred on the
eve of the invasion of Manchuria. Chinese farmers, upset that Koreans had dug an irrigation
ditch beyond their leased territory and into the Chinese territory, called the police which resulted
in the arrest of some of the Korean workers. Japanese police were dispatched to protect the
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Koreans and had a stand-off with the angered Chinese farmers until the Chinese authorities
backed down and the Japanese soldiers over saw the completion of the ditch. This resulted in
violent anti-Chinese and anti-Korean riots within Korean and Chinese communities, respectively.
Japanese politicians framed these policies aimed at Koreans as anti-Japanese, accusing China of
aggressive actions against Japanese subjects. According to the Lytton Report, the Chinese
government did eventually admit their policies were anti-Japanese.31 Despite this, Park points out
that Chinese aggression towards the Koreans was based more on politics than it was ethnicity.32
This is supported by early 20th century Chinese scholar, M.C.L. Chen, who explained that
Japan’s intentional interference with the naturalization process for Koreans forced China to take
increasingly anti-Korean policies which necessarily took the form of anti-Japanese policies.33
Koreans faced discrimination from both Chinese and Japanese policies and police. As
members of the Japanese Empire, Koreans were subject to searches by the Japanese consular
police. Japan placed police in Kando to manage the anti-Japanese sentiment found among many
post-annexation immigrants from Korea, this action also served to extend Japanese military
power in the region.34 Despite the heavy Japanese surveillance, however, Korean farmers in
Manchuria saw the Japanese as means to acquire land and security from increasingly agitated
Chinese communities.
The Mitsuya Agreement
The Mitsuya Agreement was a pact made between the police forces of the Korean
Governor-General and the Chinese authorities in 1925 and was named after the Japanese Police
Commissioner Mitsuya Norio of the Korean Governor-Generalship. The agreement was signed
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to prevent the spread of communist activity in the region, a mutual goal for both powers. It
created a means for police co-operation between the two powers in dealing with Korean
undesirables. The agreement curbed the rights of Koreans to bear arms, freely assemble, and held
entire communities responsible if a Korean communist was found among them. Punishments for
harboring such criminals included expelling the whole community from their land. Additionally,
the agreement included a clause whereby Chinese authorities would release Korean prisoners
into Japanese custody. This agreement was also used by Chinese officials to denounce Japanese
claims that Chinese authorities were intentionally harassing Korean immigrants. This agreement
was used to surveil and undermine Korean anti-Japanese movements, which were especially
prevalent in Kando.35 The fear of spreading anti-Japanese sentiment also played into the lack of
reform over the Koreans’ nationality as authorities worried that through becoming Chinese
citizens, the Japanese would lose the jurisdiction over those Koreans.36
The implementation of the treaties discussed were confusing and often contained
contradictory policy toward the Koreans. Seen as an economic asset by both China and Japan,
the Koreans were the rope in the territorial tug-of-war going on between the two larger powers.
As such, Korean behavior was dictated and punished by whichever power happened to claim
authority in the region at a given time. Despite their animosity, however, Chinese and Japanese
authorities managed to begin a form of cooperation that intensified the surveillance of and
intervention the lives of the Koreans. Meanwhile, an aggressive Japanese policy of expansion,
coupled with the stationing of consular police, strengthened Japanese claims in the area. Koreans
would rely on Japanese strength to protect themselves from Chinese policies aimed at curbing
Korean rights and business in Manchuria.
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The Imperial Context
While the competing interests of Japan and China ceased after the Japanese invasion and
the founding of Manchukuo, the legal ambiguity did not. In Manchukuo, Koreans changed from
agents of Japanese imperial expansion to those of economic expansion. From its founding,
Manchukuo became a hub of Japanese investment as the military cleared out bandits and rebels
who resisted Japanese control of the region. From 1932 to 1941, Manchukuo received more
investment than the rest of the Japanese Empire combined.37 Despite attempts to industrialize the
region, most of Manchukuo’s income came from the export of soybeans and other agricultural
products. The Manchurian soy industry exported mostly to Europe and Japan and resulted in a
global monopoly of the crop.38 Koreans in Manchukuo were primarily used to develop land for
agriculture, having an affinity for wet-rice farming. Between 1915 and 1930, Korean
contributions in Manchukuo increased rice production from 7 million to 17 million bushels
annually.39
Despite having an increasingly functional bureaucracy and large industrial growth,
Manchukuo remained a nation with no citizens. Debates over Korean rights hindered the reform
process in the Japanese Empire, which continued to be a problem even after Manchukuo passed a
temporary residency law aimed at addressing the nationality issue. As Japanese subjects,
Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese were all kept from adopting a dual nationality within
Manchukuo, further revealing the limited extent to which the state was truly dedicated to panAsianism.
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Riding the popularity it received from its string of victories since the First Sino-Japanese
War, the military, specifically the Kwantung Army acted increasingly independently to the point
of defying the orders of the Japanese Cabinet. With popular support and a string of pro-military
acts of terrorism in Japan keeping the Cabinet too scared to act, the Kwantung Army was able to
advance into Manchuria with little resistance from home. This Japanese aggression represents
what Louise Young describes as a shift away from the arms limitations and international
cooperation with the League of Nations at the end of the 1910’s towards a “Japanese Monroe
Doctrine” that sought to counter Russian, Chinese, and Anglo interests in the region as Imperial
Japan moved into the 1930’s.40
During the years following World War One, when a rice shortage emerged in Japan, the
image of Korea as Japan’s ‘rice basket’ became increasingly prevalent. Japan’s gradual
economic recovery, however, led to a surplus of rice being raised in Korea which Japan no
longer needed. Through this economic manipulation by Japan, Korea began to enter a recession
as their rice lost its market value.41 This situation was especially difficult for the agricultural
workers who made up the majority of Korea’s population. Since annexation in 1910, Japanese
development companies had been investing in Korean agriculture and industry seeking to
improve the farming methods of their rice basket. This investment raised the prices of goods and
services in Korea and income tax tripled in Korea from 1917-1927.42 Unable to afford the costs
of living, dispossessed Korean farmers came to rely on loans from Japanese development
companies who would send them to Kando and Manchuria to develop the land.
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The turmoil of World War One and the Great Depression resulted in new ways to think
about national economics. Increasingly, protectionist policies and state-run economics began to
rise in popularity in response to the instability of the war and the subsequent recession. For some
nations, this took the form of currency blocs that unified a region with several states under the
same currency. In Japan’s case, the development of the yen-bloc reflected the desire of a selfsustaining economic environment safe from the unpredictability of the world economy.43 The
yen-bloc included the Empire of Japan (Japan, Formosa, Korea, and SE Asia) as well as
Manchukuo. The bloc unified the currency of its members and ostensibly encouraged trade to
help supply the bloc with what they lacked via internal trade. Given that Japan was at the center
of both its own empire and the administration of Manchukuo, it is no surprise that the bloc
emphasized Japanese interests above those of the others members of the empire.
Both the yen-bloc and the pan-Asian ideals of Manchukuo, however, are just two
components of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Although not the focus of the
paper, the Sphere is a good example of how similar strategies of co-opting ethnic selfdetermination being used to justify policies in Manchukuo and Korea extended beyond into the
other regions of the Japanese Empire. The Sphere was announced in a speech by Japanese
Foreign Affairs Minister Arita Hachiro in late-June 1940. In the brief statement, Arita asserts that
Japan is a “stabilizing force” in Asia that seeks to unite a “geographically, racially, culturally,
and economically” similar region for the advancement of world peace. Finally, he chastises
Chiang Kai-Shek for opposing Japan’s peaceful ambitions and justifies war with China along the
same logic. In this announcement, the influence of Kodera’s rhetoric is present as Arita claims
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Japan role as leader of Asia by appealing to its relative strength and good intentions towards East
Asia.44
Interestingly, Arita highlights the war in Europe to explain the necessity of strong
regional Co-Prosperity Spheres while asking the Western powers not to interfere with Japan’s
actions. He posited that since Japan remained neutral towards the war in Europe (Imperial Japan
would sign the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy two months later), that
Europe too should limit its interests concerning Japanese actions in East Asia.45 Referencing the
disunity of Europe, Arita further held that unity and stability within spheres founded on the
above mentioned factors are key to world peace as its gives the spheres internal stability from
which to begin international cooperation. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was an
expression of a world order unrealized. It was meant to be one of a number of spheres that would
exist around the world. Whether honest in proposing this system or simply using it to justify
Japanese behavior, this proposed system add another dimension to Manchukuo and the yen-bloc.
Manchukuo, in this sense, was meant to be a miniature version of an ideal East Asia according to
the Japanese. This is supported in the propaganda for Manchukuo which both emphasized the
pan-Asian identity of its population while highlighting the varied ethnic groups living there. This
“mini-Asia” found in Manchukuo reflects one way that is was used almost as a laboratory for
testing imperial policies.
Despite the attempts to foster an insulated economy through the yen-bloc, it ultimately
failed during the Fifteen Years War due to the reliance on foreign imports of raw materials, like
oil and iron needed for the war effort with little means to bring in the foreign currency needed to
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buy it. Any exports to Manchukuo only brought more yen into the Japanese economy, which
hindered its performance in the import market. Japan began to sell its gold reserves to bring in
the foreign currency necessary to fund its invasion of China. The eventual American embargo of
Japanese goods removed one of Japan’s top three export markets (the other two being the British
Empire and Manchukuo).46 The eventual declaration of war by Japan on the United States and
the British Empire included the increasing economic pressure placed on Japan by both U.S. and
the British in its reasoning.47 Manchukuo’s yen-based economy drained Japan of its resources
and provided it with currency it could not use to buy the materials it needed from the countries
that had them. Without the foreign currency to buy needed war materiel, the yen-bloc proved an
ineffective economic tool for Imperial Japan and resulted in the ruination of the yen by August
1945 as well as the end of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Both prior to but especially following the Great Depression, Manchuria was seen by
investors and hopeful immigrants as an open frontier, under-utilized by the Chinese. Japanese
development companies turned the Koreans from a means of extending political influence in
Kando into means of economic expansion. The development companies not only allowed poorer
Koreans to lease land, but their contractual nature also gave the landlords a means to exercise
better surveillance and control over their tenants. The goal of Japanese policy was to create a
base of independent farmers through the company collectives where the farming would take
place and could be efficiently monitored and taxed. In many ways, the pan-Asian Manchurian
utopia that Japanese wanted depended on the success of this economic strategy. No longer being
beholden to foreign markets or interests, a self-sustaining yen-bloc would, according to the
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Japanese, solve many of the issues stemming Western exploitation, to say nothing of Japanese
policy.
Korean Dispossession and the Development Companies
A popular concern for Koreans living in Korea at the time was that they were
intentionally being moved off their arable land to make room for incoming Japanese farmers.
This fear of displacement may have been the result of the previously mentioned, but over
exaggerated, worries that the Japanese had concerning overpopulation and lack of land within
Japan. Sources contradict each other, however, over whether or not this dispersal of Koreans
came about as a mere consequence of Japanese economic expansion into Korea, or by an explicit
Japanese policy aimed at dislocating Koreans. In any case the actual amount of Japanese
migrating to Korea was quite low. By 1930, of the 20 million individuals living in Korea,
500,000 (2.5%) were Japanese. Most of these Japanese worked in public services or professions.
In Japan, by the end of World War Two, over two million Korean workers had been brought
over as cheap labor. Land assessment in Japanese-occupied Korea is tricky due to the allencompassing category of “Korean land” under which all land deeds in Korea fell. By 1930
though, 55% of land in Korea was held by the Governor-Generalship of Korea. One 1932
estimate claimed that 10-20% of the land in Korea belonged to Japanese owners.48 Despite the
large amount of land in Japanese hands, the Empire’s self-sustaining yeoman rice-basket that
never came to be. In many cases, Korean land was sold to Japanese landlords who would use
cheaper Korean, rather than Japanese, labor. A similar pattern would occur in the cooperatives of
the development companies in Manchukuo.49
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In 1936, two development companies, the Korean-Manchurian and the ManchuriaKorean Development Companies, were established. The companies were intended to oversee the
immigration of Koreans into the Manchurian region as well as provide funding for Koreans to
buy land; many of the Koreans who immigrated into Manchukuo did so as debtors of Japanese
development companies. The purpose of the companies’ cooperative farms was two-fold: they
used the Koreans’ skills to convert the frontier into productive farmland while monitoring
Koreans who may have been harbored anti-Japanese sentiments. The goal of the cooperatives
within the yen-bloc strategy was to create independent landlords who would turn the farms into
self-sufficient, profitable pieces of land. Many Koreans were also attracted by the stability that
the Japanese military provided in Manchukuo. Despite the interest of Koreas in owning
Manchurian land, the project failed to produce independent landowners due to the high interest
rates attached to the loans and the lack of support for non-Japanese debtors.
The Korean-Manchurian and Manchurian-Korean Development Companies eventually
were absorbed into the Oriental Development Company which was later mostly nationalized
under the Manchukuo administration. The cooperatives—organized by the development
companies—were meant to emulate the traditional self-sufficient Korean farming community.
Each family in the cooperative had their own plot of land to till, however, after the harvest the
crops were collectivized and then equally distributed back to the families. It should be noted that
the food was distributed after the farmers had payed the collectors from the development
companies and purchased more supplies.50 While in cooperatives, Koreans described their work
in the walled communities as comparable to feudalism with limited mobility and extensive
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monitoring.51 Additionally, wages in Manchuria were low relative to Korea and China with
standard-of-living costs at about two-thirds of what they were in China.52
In the communities, debt repayment was set at a flat rate as opposed to a relative portion
of what was harvested. The amount used to repay the loan ranged from 45-75% of the crops
gathered by a cooperative. If tenants were not able to pay back the debt on time, they were forced
to take additional loans to pay for food, seeds, and supplies. If they continued to default, the
development companies would evict them off the land, often replacing the labor with other
Koreans or cheaper Chinese farmers. Sometimes the development companies would change the
terms of or go back on their contracts at the expense of the Korean tenants.53 In this manner, the
Korean tenants were further displaced from their land and driven to either seek out another
development company who would offer them loans or find life in a city where many Koreans
ended up engaging in illicit businesses. Another option was to join the anti-Japanese Korean
communist communes that existed in Manchukuo. Due to the constant threat of the Kwantung
Army and snubbing by Chinese communists, however, these communes acted more like refugee
camps for resistant Koreans rather than organized centers of resistance.54
Among the crops planted in the cooperatives was opium.55 The Manchurian was
especially lucrative on the border between China and Russia as Japan did little to stop its sale
and use. Even prior to the 1932, independent Korean farmers were attracted specifically the
northern parts of Manchuria, beyond Kando. The Koreans in the region would use their
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extraterritorial status to legalize the growth and sale of the drug by asserting their extraterritorial
rights as Japanese subjects. They could, however, still be subject to punishment, including
execution, by Chinese authorities. Throughout the 1930’s, Manchukuo contributed to the
Japanese Empire’s large opium industry.56 The debt collectors of the development companies
would usually take around 50% of the opium grown as repayment of loans and interest.57
Koreans Outside Kando
Beyond Kando and the East Manchurian Mountains lay the rest of Manchuria were for
decades foreign interests and business competed for supremacy in the region. While Kando may
have been exceptional for its large Korean population, by 1930 an estimated 400,000, or half, of
the Koreans in Manchuria lived beyond the East Manchurian.58 While the bulk of these Koreans
were farmers, there were also an estimated 40,000 that lived and worked in cities.59 The
experiences of these Koreans beyond Kando were distinct in both their distance from the Korean
peninsula and Korean communities in general.
The most popular areas to settle were along the railways of the Japanese-managed South
Manchuria Railway or along the eastern border between the USSR and Manchuria. Much of the
new Manchurian infrastructure and business brought by the Japanese was concentrated along the
railways, Koreans uninterested in farming would try to make their lives in the cities of
Manchuria rather than the plains. Of the Korean farmers in Manchuria, a significant number
settled along the border with the USSR to take part in the lucrative opium trade there. Since the
Qing invitation to immigrants in the 1870s’s, Koreans were lured by the availability of
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productive farm land. As they became lucrative, more poppy plants were grown to capitalize off
the estimated 1.5 million opium addicts living in Manchukuo in the 1930’s.60 Farmers along the
border were isolated and exposed to some dangerous elements, including having to pay
protection money to both police and local bandits. Most times when one of these parties
discovered that a farmer was paying protection money to the other, there would be consequences,
including at times, execution61 Over 90% of Koreans in Manchuria were professional
agriculturalists, mostly producing either rice or soy as well as other crops in small quantity. Of
the Koreans not involved in agriculture, half were estimated to have been engaged in illicit
activities including “illegal trading, smuggling, insubordination towards authorities, and tax
evasion.”62
Although a significant numbers of Koreans were involved in the opium industry they by
no means managed the majority of it. In 1922 in the city of Harbin, a formerly Russian city
acquired by the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese War, as well as a hub for international trade,
Koreans handled less than 1/6 of the 18,000 kilograms of opium being trafficked through the
city.63 The largest opium handlers were the Japanese and Chinese merchants who in total
trafficked 13,200 kilograms of opium in 1922. Koreans primarily operated the opium dens where
addicts could safely use opium under their supervision.64 City life could be especially
challenging for Koreans. Those with educations who were not idlers or otherwise engaged in
trafficking were often hired by anti-Japanese groups. Koreans were not exclusively limited to a
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life of either farming or crime as a small professional class existed in cities included traders,
teachers, and other legitimate forms of employment.65
For city-dwelling Koreans, the opium industry was very attractive because of the
extraterritoriality they held as Japanese subjects. Since most of the cities in Manchuria were
along the South Manchurian Railways, most of them were managed by Japanese officials. Given
the increased authority of the Japanese in the cities, the conflicts of the rights granted to Koreans
as per the treaties discussed tended to favor Korean and Japanese interests. Following the
Mitsuya Agreement, Koreans caught in opium related crimes would often be handed over to
Japanese authorities. The Japanese, who took a lenient stance regarding the opium trade, would
often release these Koreans unpunished. Despite only about 5% of Koreans in Manchuria being
engaged in illicit activities, their participation in these acts and their preferred treatment by the
Japanese created stereotypes of Koreans as criminals, drug dealers, and lackeys of the Japanese
to the Chinese.66 One example of this is in the nickname given to the Japanese by the Chinese:
guizi (鬼子) or “devils,” while Koreans came to be termed er guizi (二鬼子) or “second
devils.”67
Koreans as Japanese Subjects
Prior to 1932, Korean nationality was less important to the Japanese than ensuring their
subject status within the Empire. In Manchukuo, the Koreans were no longer able to avoid their
status as subject of the Japanese Empire. Even with Manchuria secured, worries over rebellious
Korean subjects still continued to bog down the process of nationality reform. In Manchukuo,
Koreans created an obvious rupture between the pan-Asian ideology of the state and the material
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reality of the Japanese Empire. For this reason, the Korean experience as both beneficiaries and
victims of Japanese imperialism, offer insight into the nature and organization of Imperial
Japan’s racial hierarchy.
Despite the abuses by the Japanese through their dispossession of land, as Japanese
subjects, the Koreans enjoyed relative privilege in Manchukuo. Korean and Japanese relations
did not take place inside a bubble and Koreans maintained an elevated status as Japanese
subjects. Especially in the case of Manchukuo, Koreans and Japanese were only two of the five
races that made up the Manchurian identity. Through Japanese treaties, Koreans became the
beneficiaries of Japanese extraterritoriality in regions where Japanese strength was there to
enforce it. As such, the Koreans, through their association with Japan, developed a sense of
superiority over the local Chinese peasants.68
In the plains of Manchuria, the development companies gave Koreans access to better
housing, supplies, and loans than were offered to Chinese farming communities.69 The relatively
strong ties to Japan allowed Koreans to avoid being stereotyped by the Japanese as harshly as the
Chinese had been. The Chinese, having been described as “built for work,” reveals their place in
the Manchurian hierarchy.70 Instead, the Koreans were given paternal treatment by the Japanese
who saw Koreans as a kind of “foster child,” even if in practice this policy turned into one of
cultural and economic oppression by the Japanese over the Koreans.71
With no more restrictive treaties preventing Manchurian land ownership, Koreans further
benefitted from their status as Japanese subjects through the assistance they were granted by the
Kyō wakai, or Concordia Association. The Concordia Association was a Manchurian organization
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that sought to encourage the racial harmony espoused by the country and gave financial
assistance to the Koreans while concentrating them into designated districts. In this way,
Koreans tended to be massed with other Koreans and were able to maintain their cultural and
linguistic practices separate from the other races and cultural practices in Manchukuo.72 In fact,
aside from the Chinese who made up the vast majority of Manchukuo, there seems to have been
a pattern of same-race grouping and a failure to truly diversify the region with intermixing of the
different peoples.73 Intermixing the ethnicities of the region however, may not have ever been the
goal of Manchukuo as the propaganda highlights the cooperation between the Five Races rather
than promoting cultural interaction.
When assimilation was called for, such as between Korean and Japan, it was done so not
with the intent to merge the cultures of two nations together but to bend Koreans into “proper”
Japanese subjects. In Korea, this goal took the shape of policies that suppressed local Korean
language and culture and enforced the teaching of Japanese. In Manchukuo, however, in keeping
with the pan-Asian image, policies were taken to preserve the diversity of the different ethnic
groups in the region, even going so far as to have segregated communities to prevent
intermarrying.74 Following the Confucian logic that Japan used to justify its place in Manchukuo
as the “leader” of the other East Asian races, the same logic made the formation of a racial
hierarchy natural within the Manchurian context. Japan’s ethnic policy in Manchukuo was one of
proximity rather than assimilation, decrying Western racial theory as too dualistic, they instead
sought to find a place for race within nationality. Accusing the West of ignorance over East
Asian racial theory while demonstrating their use of Confucian concepts, the Manchurian
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administration was able to justify racial segregation as a form of cultural appeasement to the
Chinese of Manchukuo.75
An examination of the system through which the Japanese Empire determined the
nationality and took the census of its subjects reveals a system closer reflecting a first and
second-class citizen relationship between the Japanese and the Koreans. It reveals the knot Japan
had become tied in due to its insistence on maintaining different categorizations for those who
could trace their lineage to the Japanese mainland (naichijin), and their fellow non-Japanese
subjects (gaichijin). Although (lopsided) cultural assimilation was encouraged, very few of the
civil rights held by native Japanese subjects were offered in exchange.
As Japan began to modernize following the Meiji Restoration, it developed both a family
registry, koseki, and registration for nationality, kokuseki, in which Japanese subjects would be
recorded. The koseki was modeled on traditional modes of recording heads of household as had
been done in pre-Meiji Japan. It counted one, usually male, head of household under whom the
members of his family would be registered. To Koreans, registration into this culturally Japanese
system held implications of accepting ones role in the Japanese Empire and accepting Japanese
legitimacy.76
Questions lingered over defining kokuseki however, as Japan’s new imperial holdings
brought ethnically non-Japanese subjects into the Empire. In applying the system to their
subjects, the Taiwanese were able to choose whether or not to continue their traditional way of
registering nationality or adopt the Japanese system. Koreans on the other hand, had the Japanese
system forced on them with no real solution for the missing kokuseki and whether the Koreans
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held Korean or Japanese nationality as Japanese subjects.77 In Japanese legal rhetoric, including
the Meiji Constitution, these questions were temporarily addressed through the use of ‘shinmin’
(臣民), or subject, rather than ‘kokumin’ (国民), national, when discussing those who inhabited
the empire. Kokumin too, however, was a politically loaded term that was used to describe
patriotic citizens. This distinction however, is important is pointing out that even as Japan began
to adopt the use of kokumin, a further distinction was maintained between national and citizen
that preserved the old hierarchy.78
In 1909, a law to establish a minseki registry was passed. Minseki would be replaced by
koseki as the popular form of registering Koreans in 1920. Minseki, whose definition is at times
incorrectly translated as nationality, is something more subtle than a mere political status. The
min character means “people,” seki means “registry.” An explanation of the difference between
nationality, citizenship, and minseki not only explains a finer point of this law but perhaps
reveals a key observation about the Japanese understanding of international relations and their
own multi-ethnic empire.
While Japan was able to study the West and emulate it to the point of becoming a major
world power, it held on to certain cultural features and conceptions that would not fit in the
increasingly liberalizing world especially following World War One. Umeyama Kayoko
suggests that perhaps because Japan only studied the political developments of the
Enlightenment but never had its own “people’s revolution” (市民革命) it lacked crucial
experience with liberal values. Demonstrated in the eventual replacement of minseki by koseki,
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while minseki might not just apply to an ethnic group, separate koseki for different ethnicities
further equated nationality to ethnicity by tying one’s identity to their homeland. This failure to
understand the importance of clear nationality in a world of nations, and instead choosing to rely
on ethno-centric census taking methods desynchronized Japan with the emerging understandings
of international relations and jurisdiction by national borders.79
This diplomatic dissonance is also seen in the other of Manchukuo’s slogans: Ōdō
Rakudo, or the Kingly Way. One way through which the administrators of Manchukuo sought to
appeal to Chinese nationalist sentiment was the adoption of this Confucian principle. Without a
lengthy explanation of Confucianism, the philosophy holds that the key to a successful state is
ensuring reverence from the masses up towards the emperor who in turn is bound to bestow
benevolence upon his subjects lest the Mandate of Heaven in lost. This guiding principle violated
several important tenants of the liberal nation-state. The Confucian state, unlike the West, was
not understood as a contract between governing and governed, but a relationship between ruler
and ruled. Borders did not impede the reach of the “benevolent ruler” who held a Heavenbestowed claim to rule over certain peoples. While Ōdō Rakudo was used to appeal to Chinese
sentiments, it was also used to justify the inequality that existed between the different ethnic
groups in Manchukuo. By claiming that in a harmonious kingdom some groups naturally occupy
a superior status than others, Japanese supremacy was given cultural justification.80
The fate of Morisaki Minato presents an interesting opportunity to observe the effects of
Japan’s pan-Asian propaganda on a Japanese subject while noting briefly the attitudes held by
the other races towards Japan. Morisaki was the sharp child of wealthy of family who enrolled in
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the Manchuria Nation Building University (満州国の建国大学) in 1942.81 This university was
part of the nation-building undertaken by Japan and accepted students of multiple ethnic
backgrounds including Korean, Russian, and Manchu (which included both ethnic Manchu and
Han Chinese).82 Enamored with what Manchukuo meant to represent, Morisaki upheld that Japan
would “salvage Chinese from the Euro-American exploitation,” and that Japan’s actions and
intent differed from that of “Euro-Americans,” the Soviets, and Nazi Germany. Minato, believed
that “each race has to have its own place of peaceful living, fulfill its obligations, and cooperate
[with] each other,” rhetoric reminiscent of Arita’s speech establishing the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
He further believed that Manchukuo, under the leadership of the Japanese was the means through
which to achieve this.83
As he interacted with and befriended non-Japanese students, he became gradually
disillusioned of pan-Asian sentiment especially concerning Chinese struggles. Morisaki
concludes that “those who genuinely think of Asia’s future and whom we need as comrades for
our ideal, are all on the sides of our enemies. I… respect their anti-Japanese sentiments.”84 One
thing Minato, among others, struggled with was the difference between the state and the nation
and the artificial nature of the state. Quoting Sun Yat-Sen, Minato says: “the group molded by
nature…is the race, nationality,” the disenchanted Morisaki became unable to support
Manchukuo and further quotes that: “the group formed by… might is the State,” a repudiation of
Japan’s actions in Manchuria. Morisaki joined the Imperial Navy in 1944 and committed suicide
at age twenty-one following Japan’s defeat. With a belief in the morality of pan-Asianism, and
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first-hand witness experience to the unfair treatment of non-Japanese in Manchukuo, the inability
to synthesize state policy and racial harmony has been proposed as reasons for his fatal choice
and that without these thoughts, Morisaki would have chosen life.85
Law in Manchukuo
Throughout its existence, Manchukuo was given little in means of independently
establishing their politics, instead having to rely on Japanese models and oversight. The Lytton
Report placed additional pressure on Manchurian bureaucrats to demonstrate a developed legal
system and independent rule to demonstrate legitimacy. One way that Japan attempted to garner
international support was to preserve the extraterritoriality of the foreign powers (including
Japan) that had been negotiated with China.86 Manchukuo’s foundational legal systems consisted
of the Organic Law (Law of the Organization of the State of Manchukuo) that established a
legislative and executive body with an independent judiciary that included independent
procurators who both investigated and judged the cases. This law also included a twelve-part
Human Rights protection law. It also included a pledge to quickly standardize laws and issue a
constitution.87 Despite these provisions, Thomas David Dubois maintains that in Manchukuo, the
law was viewed as a “practical means” to obtain a moral state but that the rhetoric of Ōdō
Rakudo placed the Emperor, at the center of the political order. He also pointed out, however,
that at the time it was common knowledge that Manchukuo was ruled by the Kwantung Army.88
In 1937, a Manchurian legal code was introduced that resembled that of Japan’s
(although it should be noted that by this point China too had borrowed extensively from reforms
in Japan). One telling difference is the relative weakness of the Manchurian Diet to the
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Manchurian Emperor (executive branch), when compared to the Japanese Diet and the Japanese
Emperor. It has been suggested that the Manchurian Diet’s status of “executive assistants” rather
than effective lawmakers, was what pro-emperor factions of Japan had hoped the Diet would be
in Japan. 89 Again, Manchukuo acted as a kind of testing ground for policies that were difficult to
achieve within Japan. Despite this, however, Manchukuo remained dependent on Japan for legal
guidance, shown through the establishment of the Japan-Manchukuo Judicial Services Aid Law
in 1938. This law began a process of standardizing Manchukuo’s laws according the Japan’s and
allowing international law suits without the arbitrations of the countries’ respective foreign
ministries, easing the application of Japanese law across the Empire and Manchukuo. This
process however, was not unique to Japan and had precedence in Europe as Germany had made
similar agreement with other nations, including Britain, in the 1920’s.90
Manchukuo’s legal code provided forms of legal autonomy with respect to the custom
law of different ethnicities. In areas like inheritance law, Japanese subjects were governed under
Japanese law through a biased court system. Russians too, were given autonomy in their laws to
demonstrate Manchukuo’s respect for Westerns and Christian. Han, Manchu, and Mongols,
however, were subject to the same code of laws after a three year-long government research
project aimed at standardizing custom law assessed (erroneously) that they operated under
basically the same laws. For family law however, Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans were
governed under the same laws while Mongols were allowed to follow their own custom law.91 It
should be noted, however, that British observers in Manchuria noted that “there are doubtless
some [Japanese officials] who desire to create for Manchukuo, some real independence,” the
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new state was not merely a front for unilateral expansion by the Japanese.92 Indeed, large
numbers of Chinese initially joined the Manchurian bureaucracy and the answers on their legal
exams reflected enthusiastic (if formulaic) answers regarding the role of Ōdō Rakudo and the
racial harmony in the nation. Many Chinese jurors and judges would, however, resign following
Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 and the shattering of any pan-Asian hope Manchukuo may
have offered them.93
As for criminal law, however, Manchukuo maintained strong policies mostly in the name
of national security. These included the 1932 Provisional Law for the Punishment of Political
Criminals that targeted behavior that “undermined the state”; and the 1938 National Mobilization
Law which gave the state strong powers regarding individual freedoms and property in “times of
emergency.”94 In Manchukuo, flogging, despite being outlawed in Japan in 1872, was a practice
reserved for the Chinese until 1938 when it was outlawed by the Kwantung Army. It was seen
(not without critics, including other Japanese) as a fitting means of discipline for a backwards
people, and played into notions of people as either civilized or un-civilized determining the kinds
of laws that could be applied to them.95
Following the introduction of the 1937 legal code, Dubois says that increasingly
totalitarian measures were taken in the name of national security and that this process was
intensified following Japan’s declaration of war on the United States and Britain in 1942.96
Through Manchukuo’s reliance on Japanese law, and the strength of the Kwantung Army, the
laws in Manchukuo, as well as Japan, were bent to suit imperial and military needs. Some
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examples include the creation of special courts dealing with crimes against the state and the
elimination of the accused’s right to defend themselves or appeal their sentencing.97 Others
include a new thought policing law in 1944 whose vague wording expanded the powers of the
police, those found guilty of thought crimes would be punished with physical labor as part of
their reeducation.98 This resulted in huge increases for arrests and convictions between 1933
(25,538) and 1943 (77,997) with the most growth in convictions coming from the category of
“special laws not counting opium laws,” with a 917% increase over the ten year period resulting
in 30,612 convictions in 1943.99
Manchukuo appears to have had some levels of popular support for non-Japanese seeking
to create an independent pan-Asian nation. Despite this, the weakness of the social institutions
and lack of a constitution, as well as the supremacy of the Kwantung Army in politics, meant
that the laws of the state were subject to the needs of the Empire and army. One way to consider
the situation is through the mass resignations of Chinese officials in 1937. In 1934 a policy
aiming to attract more Japanese judges to Manchukuo would result in the firing of many Chinese
officials in 1936 in order to balance the number of Japanese and Chinese judges. This prompted
a first wave or resignations in 1935 from disillusioned Chinese upset at the Japanese. The huge
amount of vacancies, now expected to be filled by Japanese lawyers, led to a decline in quality of
those hired, resulting in ineffective and slow courts.100 The second wave of resignation by
Chinese officials came as a response to the invasion of China and the extinguishing of hopes
projected on Manchukuo, however, they were only joined by one high-ranking Japanese official.
Dubois asserts this anecdote as “perhaps the best evidence” of the lack of regard for pan-Asian
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ideals by the Japanese officials in Manchukuo.101 A general understanding of Manchukuo’s legal
structures is important in understanding the ways in which they were subverted by the needs of
the Japanese Empire through legal dependency. Additionally, it provides insight into what kind
of state Manchukuo was developing into by the 1940s.
The 1940 Provisional Citizenship Law
The increasing pressures of war gave an added sense of urgency to the ratification of a
law that would help carry out conscription and war-time labor programs as well as foster a
national spirit within Manchukuo. In 1939, during the 6th nationwide meeting of the chapters of
the Concordia Association, representatives from eight ministries, including Kando, introduced a
bill that sought to provide a method through which a nationality law could be introduced in
Manchukuo. The Kando representative, weighing in on the proposed law, observed that if a
provisional registration system were put in place that it could ease the transition into a complete
nationality law. The Kando representative held that all residents, including those who held
foreign nationalities, of Manchukuo would be entered into the system equally.102 Defending the
legislation by appealing to the desire to foster a national identity and racial harmony, the
provisional law was put into place August 1940.103
That December, a nationwide special inspection occurred and police were used to begin
registering residents into the provisional system. The provisional law called for the registration
of all races in Manchukuo as residents in the name of uniting them all under uniform law.104
Provisions were also made for foreigners who lived in Manchukuo long enough to be considered
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naturalized citizens. The information gathered from the 1940 census was entered into the
people’s register (民籍簿) and sought to establish their minseki (民籍), to say nothing of actual
citizenship. The minseki of those registered were based on their honseki (本籍) which was
defined as the place where one’s original minseki was located. Thus, although all were counted
as Manchurian residents, little was done to establish a definition of citizenship categorized by
where they came from rather than where they were For example, a Korean who moved to
Manchukuo would have a Korean honseki, while an immigrant from mainland Japan would have
a Japanese honseki. In Manchukuo, the honseki of both these people would become their
respective minseki. This categorization served to determine under which legal codes an
individual would be prosecuted.
Although the registration was successful in collecting such details as the members of the
family, race, and date they arrived in Manchukuo (among other things), the process ultimately
exposed more issues than it solved.105 One of the most obvious contradictions that stood out in
the proposing of a nationality law was the conflict it created between Manchukuo’s dual policies
of assimilation and respecting the customary law of the different ethnic groups within
Manchukuo. Outside of the Five Races that Manchukuo claimed to represent, there were an
estimated twenty other ethnic groups who had their own customs that Manchukuo’s legal system
would have to accommodate.
Recall that Japan’s nationality law requires one to relinquish their Japanese nationality
before accepting a new one. Under the provisional system in Manchuria, Japanese subjects,
despite being part of the Five Races, were registered as alien residents. Advocates for nationality
law reform argued that a dual-system that registered Japanese subjects both as Japanese subjects
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and their respective koseki (i.e. their place within the Empire) would be confusing and pointless.
Additionally, such an exemption would go against the fostering of racial harmony that the
tentative law was attempting to do. An exception was eventually made through a law passed
December 1942. The law allowed for acceptance of the various koseki of Japanese subjects in the
register by circumventing of Manchukuo’s district courts, requiring only that incoming Japanese
subjects report their corresponding nationality to their village chiefs. The result, however, was
increased pressure for a dual citizenship law to be passed in Japan.106
The progress of Manchukuo’s nationality law was in part modeled on registration polices
that had been applied to Koreans in Manchuria. After 1910, most of the Koreans who had
immigrated to Manchuria without naturalizing as Chinese became Museki Chō senjin (無籍朝鮮
人), or Koreans with no registered nationality. Since Imperial Japan had declared that all
Koreans were Japanese subjects, the Japanese began an extensive registration process. In 1939,
the unregistered Koreans were instructed to attach of copy of their koseki (which would mark
them as being from Korea) when entering themselves in the Manchurian registry. In this way, the
unregistered Koreans became registered as Koreans (and by extension part of the Japanese
Empire) instead of Manchurians.107 Despite allowing them to keep their status as Koreans, the
rate of Korean registration was lower than expected. It was reported that few had interests in
registering, and because many farmers lived in the Manchurian “outback,” thorough registration
enforcement was made even more difficult. Additionally, it seemed many Koreans simply
wanted to focus on cultivating their land while some intentionally avoided registration to avoid
further Japanese interference with their lives.108
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Initially excluded from compulsory military service, the demands of war led Japan to
open up and later compulsorily enlist their subjects into the Imperial Army. An edict in May
1942 began preparations for a conscription program within Korea. Japanese legislators, however,
argued that the more pressing issue lay with the conscription of Koreans who lived outside of
Korea. This problem was addressed with a temporary resident registration order. A similar order
was carried out in 1914 that provided a means to keep track of Japanese nationals (subjects) from
abroad. This did not, however, extend to Korean subjects. In Manchukuo, a law that did apply to
Koreans was enacted in September 1942. According to it, Koreans living outside their honseki
area (Korea), as well as those without honseki or a clear registration status who lived in an area
for over 90 days, would be entered into the temporary residency log. With regards to Manchuria,
the Governor-General of Korea announced that the temporary residence would be recorded into
the Manchurian minseki record, not Korea’s. Through keeping more intensive records on the
Koreans in Manchuria, Imperial Japan and Manchukuo sought to rationalize the mobilization
process.109 In 1943, a law similar to the Japanese temporary residence law was passed in
Manchukuo. Mimicking the Japanese law, people who were living outside their honseki for over
90 days were to be entered into the temporary residence record. Exceptions were made for
certain groups including Japanese soldiers and military personnel.
Further issues arose, however, around the transitory nature of Manchukuo’s population as
the country had a large number of foreign laborers who would enter and leave the state for work.
Additionally, by 1943, the worsening condition of Japanese war efforts began to affect
Manchukuo as Japanese subjects began to evacuate back to their homeland. The problem was
worsened as, by this point, Manchukuo still hadn’t completed a complete and accurate census. In
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an attempt to curb the number of people leaving, Manchukuo declared the revocation of
Manchurian minseki upon leaving. Despite this, many left with no intention to return. This
revocation of minseki also aimed to curb the Chinese migrant workers and roving groups of
bandits who would enter and leave the country with fake nationalities. Unable to solve either
their nationality or immigration issues, one member of the Manchurian Administration of Justice
Department described the lack of clear Manchurian nationality as a “cancer” afflicting the
nation.110
In January 1944, the Manchurian newspaper Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun predicted that
by July, the registration of the nation’s minseki would be completed.111 Despite this, now
constitution or definition for citizenship was provided and its completion meant little in terms of
civil rights by this point. These would never come to fruition as the Japanese Empire and
Manchukuo would fall the next year.
Although the provisional citizenship law may have been a step in the right direction, the
ultimate impetus for its non-existence lay in the Japanese Cabinet. Without dual citizenship, the
subjects of Imperial Japan would remain nominal foreigners in Manchukuo. The internal debate
going on in Japan in regards to a dual citizenship law for Japanese subjects, and especially as
pertained to the Korean subjects, undermined similar efforts in Manchukuo. Although able to
exercise limited autonomy, Manchukuo‘s decision-making ability ultimately lay with the
Japanese Cabinet and the Japanese bureaucrats who populated Manchukuo’s administration.
The Nationality Debate in Japan
Despite claiming to respect the traditional laws of the various ethnic groups residing
within, Manchurian laws were mostly modeled after those of Imperial Japan. While attempting
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to emphasize the diversity of the Pan-Asian state, Korean and Taiwanese residents in
Manchukuo, as Japanese subjects, were held to the laws set by their Japanese colonizers as
“custom law.”112 As for the Japanese subjects within Manchukuo, one of the largest
contradictions in the case for Manchurian independence was that despite its founding principle of
racial equality, Japan held on to its extraterritorial rights until 1937.113
Prior to the abolition of extraterritoriality in Japan, there had been a demonstration by
Japanese in Manchukuo protesting the abolition.114 Many Japanese individuals, urban and rural
benefitted from their extraterritoriality and were generally opposed to nationality reform. Even
after extraterritoriality had been formally renounced, however, there was still no universal legal
code applied to residents of Manchukuo. In fact, the first clause of the treaty ending
extraterritoriality stated that Japanese subjects (Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese) would be
treated according to Japanese law in Manchurian courts.115 The extraterritoriality had been
encoded into the law thereby making Manchukuo appear as a more legitimate state at no cost to
the Japanese Empire.
A number of factors have been suggested as to why the home government never amended
the law to provide a means for dual citizenship including simply that the pressures of war
distracted legislators from ever passing such a law. Professor Park has suggested that while
Japanese citizens may have resisted losing their privileges, a significant source of nationality
reform advocacy actually came from within the Japanese Kwantung Army whose officers
populated Manchukuo’s bureaucracy. It has been suggested that one goal on nationality reform
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would be further autonomy for the Kwantung Army from the Japanese Cabinet.116 In many ways,
Manchukuo was a signifier for the internal conflicts within Japan between the civilian
government and the increasingly influential military.
Some observations on the kinds of immigrants that came from Japan to Manchukuo
offers insight into the willingness of Japanese to change their nationality. Japanese immigration
to Manchukuo was primarily done in two waves: the initial investors who occupied the Liaodong
Leased Territory following the Russo-Japanese War after 1905, these were mostly investors or
factory workers living in urban areas. Agricultural immigrants came as part of a 1936 Japanese
policy to encourage the relocation of five million Japanese farmers into Manchukuo over a
twenty year period. The initial wave of immigrants mostly came from the upper and middle
classes of Japan and were hired either by the consulate, the South Manchurian Railway
Company, or one of its various sub-companies that began early Japanese developments in the
region.117 The farmers, normally too poor to afford to move, received aid via the same
development companies contracting Koreans to bring them over to Manchukuo.118
Japanese immigrants to Manchukuo, however, only had to pay half of their land loans
and could take loans three times as large and at a lower interest rate than those given to Koreans.
Additionally, Japanese immigrants often became landlords rather than tenants, buying the land
that the Korean tenants had developed and then giving preference to cheaper Chinese laborers,
further displacing the Koreans tenants.119 Despite the relatively larger access to loans given to
them, until the defeat of Japan and dissolution of Manchukuo, the program only managed to
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attract roughly 270,000 farmers and their families from Japan.120 A 1940 census revealed that the
Japanese population in Manchukuo was approximately 820,000 (1.9%) and was mostly
concentrated in cities; working in commerce, professions, in the Manchurian administration, or
the Kwantung Army.121 Louise Young concluded that to the elite majority within Manchukuo,
the new state was only meant to be a temporary home where they could oversee their
investments before returning to Japan.122 The incoming farmers did not have the resources to
return but relied on favorable treatment to guarantee prosperity in their new homes.
The Japanese who came to Manchukuo to farm, despite having privileges over nonJapanese farmers, led much harsher lives than the more wealthy Japanese who first came to
Manchuria to invest and administrate. Japanese farmers that returned from Manchukuo to Japan
often faced discrimination in their home country. Some thought that living outside of Japan
among so many non-Japanese for such a long time tainted the returnees.123 Many non-military
Japanese families were moved to the USSR border to act as a first line of defense as the war
situation worsened. Records show wives and children of these frontier farmers were encouraged
to learn how to fight in preparation for an impending Soviet invasion. Of the Japanese who were
not able to evacuate Manchukuo by the war’s end, an estimated 80,000 were killed while others
were captured by the Soviets or the Chinese.124 Some of the children of the Japanese farmers
were adopted by families of other ethnicities and since normalization of Sino-Japanese relations
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in 1972, a program of repatriation has been put in place for the now adult Japanese children who
were abandoned by Imperial Japan in Manchukuo.125
For Korean subjects, one further complicating factor in the nationality debate was the
naisen ittai (内鮮一体) policy adopted by Japan. Literally, “Japan and Korea as one body,” the
policy was rhetorically meant to encourage equality between the colony and the metropole and
eliminate the second-class citizen position held by Koreans through assimilating the Korean
people not only as Japanese subject but as members of “true” Japan (内地).126. In reality, it is an
example of a “polite racism,” afforded to Koreans in Japanese assimilationist rhetoric.127 While
seeming to support Japanese and Korean unity, actual assimilation polices aimed to erase Korean
culture and replace it with Japanese culture.
Since Manchukuo’s founding, Korea still lacked the nationality law that would allow
Koreans to relinquish their status as Japanese nationals to become Manchurian citizens. Even
prior to Manchukuo’s founding, the question of how a separate registration for Koreans fit the
naisen ittai policy had been raised within the Japanese Cabinet with some claiming that the
separate categories were discriminatory and ran counter to the policy. The responses to this claim
mostly focused on the threat that such a policy could have on further enabling anti-Japanese
movements. By holding certain rights from Korean subjects, Japanese authorities could better
monitor and suppress potential subversive activities. As the war worsened, so too did these
anxieties. Other complicating factors included that the conditions for Korea naturalization were
more complex than those required to allow Japanese naturalization. Since Koreans were subject
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to a separate nationality law and recorded in a separate koseki, there was more complicated
reform process than there would have been for legislating on Japanese nationality law. Due to the
separate legal system, revision of Korean nationality law would have to have through both the
Japanese Cabinet as well as the Governor-General of Korea.128
It is the opinion of the author that given the increasingly totalitarian policies being
undertaken in Manchukuo and the Empire of Japan more generally following 1942, that Japanese
bureaucrats understood the costs and benefits of developing citizenship for their subjects (and by
extension Manchukuo). They chose to pursue harsh policies aimed at national security above
those aimed at assimilation as part of larger calculations in a worsening war situation. Fears over
anti-Japanese sentiment had always been in the minds of the Japanese Diet when legislating on
nationality, in Manchukuo these fears were especially poignant as the population was at least
90% Chinese at any given time from 1932-1945. If meaningful definitions of citizenship had
been in the wings for Manchurian bureaucrats, its introduction in such an increasingly dire
situation would be highly unlikely given that civil rights violations would have most likely
continued anyways, and introducing a constitution and citizenship would only agitate the
situation further. Whether or not nationality reform was only a matter of time, by August 1945 it
didn’t matter. Until then, Koreans had no means to change nationalities or abandon their new
sovereign. Abroad, treatment of Koreans varied depending on the sympathy of that country
towards Korea or animosity towards Korea. Korean Associations, set up around the world to
advocate for Korean independence would also influence the way they were perceived overseas.
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Koreans Outside Manchukuo
A quick survey of how Koreans were treated in different parts of the world because of or
despite their colonizers is revealing of the ways in which the effects of the annexation of Korea,
on Koreans, were not limited to borders of the Empire. The internment of Japanese citizens is a
notoriously dark chapter in United States history. It is taught in schools as a period of widespread
fear in America that led to the indiscriminate forcing of 120,000 citizens with Japanese heritage
into camps and the seizure of their property. Further restrictions were placed on those labeled as
enemy aliens, such as curfews and heavy monitoring.129 As this was being carried out, however,
Koreans, despite being acknowledged as Japanese subjects in legal terms, were exempt from
internment.130 While Koreans were not interred, and at times not as beholden to the above
mentioned restrictions on the Japanese, they were both victims of racist views held in the United
States that took little interest differentiating between Koreans and Japanese on the individual
level. To overcome this, Koreans in America would work hard to distance themselves from their
unwanted association with the Japanese Empire.
Korean immigration to the United States began in 1885 when a handful of Koreans fled
Japan after being pursued by the police for subversive activity. Until Korea was made a Japanese
protectorate in 1905, it sent laborers to Hawaiian sugar plantations. By the time the Japanese
ceased the Korean immigration, 7,226 Koreans had immigrated to the United States.131
Immigration would, however, continue into the United States in the form of “picture-brides”
coming to marry Korean laborers or anti-Japanese Korean students who crossed from Shanghai
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and Manchuria. Following Korean annexation and moving into the opening years of World War
Two, Korean immigrants began forming national Korean associations, advocating for Korean
independence from within the United States. Additionally, Korean students became government
translators and could even enlist in the military during the 1940’s.132
By 1940 there were approximately 1,711 Koreans on the U.S. mainland and 6,815 in
Hawaii. The June of that same year the Alien Registration Act would be passed. This would
require all Japanese subjects living in the United States to register themselves as enemy aliens.
However, the Koreans would not be required to wear, as the Japanese were, badges identifying
them as enemy aliens.133 Organizations like the Korean Committee, founded in America by antiJapanese Koreans in the years after annexation, concentrated its efforts on the classification of
Koreans as Japanese subjects by the United States. Some began to wear patches that crossed the
Korean and American flag together, demonstrating solidarity with America and the Allies. In
January 1942, an order was issued from Washington D.C. exempting Koreans from the
registration altogether.134
Interestingly, one of the only internment camps to contain significant numbers of
Koreans was the Honouliuli Internment Camp in Hawaii. Hawaii was home to largest number of
Koreans in the U.S. Since it was not yet an incorporated state, Koreans were required to register
themselves as enemy aliens in Hawaii under laws exclusive to the territory. The Koreans held in
the camp were Imperial Japanese soldiers captured from American campaigns into islands held
by Japan. All Japanese subjects – Koreans, Okinawans, Formosans, and Japanese – were
recorded into separate categories by the camp. Although considered enemy combatants, tensions

132

Brett, “Koreans in America”, 129.
Kim, “How Koreans Repealed Their ‘Enemy Alien’ Status”, 196.
134
Melendy, Asians in America, 157.
133

55

between the Korean and Japanese prisoners were such that the two groups had to be separated
within the camp.135 To further distinguish themselves, Koreans prisoners wore black patches
with the words “I am Korean” written underneath.136 Alien registration was required in Hawaii
until May 1944 when Allied victory was mostly assured and the fear that some Koreans may be
loyal Japanese agents become less pressing and a law was passed exempting Koreans.137
Just beyond Manchuria, Russo-Korean relations existed in the modern era since 1860
after Imperial Russia acquired land neighboring the area from China. In the years following the
annexation of Korea, the Russian Far East, as in the United States, became a hub for Korean
nationalist sentiment. During the Stalin Era in 1937, Koreans and other ethnic groups were
forcibly relocated as part of a Soviet resettlement project to Central Asia, near modern
Kazakhstan. Following Stalin’s death in 1953 and the removal of travel bans, many of those
moved returned to East Asia. This included many Koreans who traveled to the new Soviet
holding taken from the defeated Japanese, the southern portion of Sakhalin Island.138
Sakhalin Island lies just north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. The southern portion
of the island was taken from the Russian Empire by the Empire of Japan in 1905. Its invasion by
the Soviets in 1945 occurred as part of the larger Manchurian invasion in the final days of the
war. An estimated 40,000 Koreans who had been relocated to the South Sakhalin as cheap labor
were there when the USSR forces invaded. The Soviets allowed Koreans to learn in Korean, a
privilege that had been denied to them by the Japanese who suppressed the use of the Korean
language while educating all their subjects in Japanese. Sure in their claims on the island, the
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Soviets prepared to incorporate the Koreans into the USSR. To help promote integration and
encourage education, those Koreans in Russia who had been moved to Central Asia were sent to
South Sakhalin to administer and teach in Russian and Korean.139
In Manchuria, the Soviet invasion was recorded to have been especially violent for
Japanese as well as Chinese and Koreans. Additionally, attacks by Chinese peasants on Koreans
were also recorded as common and especially spiteful. Those sent to the Soviet prisons came
from a wide range of civil and military occupations.140 An estimated 600,000, mostly military
but some civilian Japanese personnel, were moved into Siberian labor camps. Repatriation began
in 1947 but by then approximately 60,000 Japanese prisoners had already died.141 Even down to
the finals days of the war, as Japan’s situation worsened, Koreans could still not escape their
label of Japanese subjects and were themselves made the targets of violence by upset locals who
had watched as Koreans benefitted from their unwanted status.
Within Japan itself existed the most obvious disconnect between the Japanese panAsianism and their opinions of other East Asian ethnicities. As the Japanese war effort required
an increasing number of men, Korean laborers began to be imported to replace the conscripted
Japanese citizens.142 Over two million Koreans resided in Japan by the end of the war. In the
recent past, Koreans in Japan had been scapegoats for when disaster struck Japan such as with
the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 where, following the wreckage, Japanese citizens were
recorded persecuting and killing thousands of Koreans in anger. Although there was limited
Korean representation in the Imperial Cabinet, scholarship on Imperial Japanese-Korean
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relations reveal an exploitative relationship between the two people. Additionally, it was not
until April 1945 that the vote was given to male Korean subjects, a final bid for Korean
cooperation before August.143 Even though propaganda in Japan sought to highlight Korean
achievements in the war and the equality established between Japan and Korea, there was always
an air of condescension.144
One way that this condescension is captured in Japanese culture is through film. Manei,
the Manchurian film production company, held a monopoly on the East Asian film market. Films
with Korean (and other minority) characters emphasized the adoptive relation Japan claimed it
had with Koreans. Since the Japanese and Korean characters were both Japanese subjects, films
produced in Japan tended to emphasize the Empire as a unifying factor between the peoples that
superseded animosity between the parties.145 Despite attempts at assimilation, Koreans were
often looked down upon or seen as a source for cheap labor when they came to Japan. The
failure of the assimilation polices is reflected best in the shift of Japanese racial thought around
1942 as the Japanese war situation worsened. Opposite of the previously promoted assimilation
policies, the late-war period shows an emphasis on Japanese homogeneity and a downplaying of
the diversity of the Empire.146 Despite the gradual embracing of other races in Japanese thought
since 1905, the quick about-face contraction of Japanese racial acceptance is reflective both of
the shock losing the war gave Japan and the weakness of the roots that more inclusive racial
theory had taken on the mainland.147
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Conclusion
The nationality debate in Korea had played a large role in hindering nationality reform
throughout the Japanese Empire and Manchukuo. Before anything could be settled, the
worsening war situation led to more drastic policy approaches and shift towards prioritization of
national security over the integrity of civil institutions. Manchukuo was a nation whose
foundation supposedly lay in upholding Pan-Asian ideals of equality between the Five Races.
This Pan-Asian foundation sought to appeal to the kind of ethnic determinism being advocated
for at the end of World War One. Although Japan had co-opted East Asian nationalism and bitter
feelings towards the West, its failure to genuinely follow through on those ideas created several
political quagmires for the Empire that were addressed through repressive policies. In the Korean
case, while being subjected to Japanese propaganda of pan-Asianism, the reality was the
exploitation of those on the peninsula by the Japanese. While the Koreans were used as farmers
in Manchukuo or manual laborers in Japan, at home they faced oppressive policies that included
the censorship of the Korean language and the enforcement of Japanese customs. Japanese
claims that they were encouraging Pan-Asian ideals and ethnic self-rule were completely
undermined by its actions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the purposeful undermining of
Korean self-determination and extensive exploitation as well as the standard-bearing of panAsianism followed by another aggressive invasion of China.
The controversy over nationality extended beyond just the Empire of Japan and
Manchukuo. As discussed, Koreans as Japanese subjects were exposed to a varied array of
attitudes and treatments depending on where they were. Although Japan claimed through the
naisen ittai policy that Korea and Japan were one, their treatment of the Koreans betrayed their
so-called intentions and this juxtaposition was reflected in places such as the United States which
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became host to a strong Korean independence movement. Their status as Japanese subjects did
not always privilege them and in fact fostered animosity between Koreans and yet uncolonized
targets of Japanese Imperialism.
Following the end of WWII and the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, Koreans and
Formosans, freed from Japanese sovereignty, had their Japanese citizenship revoked.148 Among
the Koreans within mainland Japan during this time were those whose families had been living in
Japan for decades. Some of these families, still considering themselves Koreans, chose not to
naturalize into Japanese citizens following the war’s end, others lacked the means by which they
could afford to return to Korea. An estimated one-third of the Koreans in Japan were given
special status as permanent Korean residents of Japan (zainichi chō senjin, 在日朝鮮人) that
allowed them to have Japanese nationality but continues to deny them access to healthcare and
public housing services. Those denied the special permission were put into internment camps
with other foreigners who would be deported back to their home countries.149 Beyond the legal
sphere, as the Japanese war situation worsened, until their loss, Japanese racial thought
contracted from their Pan-Asian ideals into a more isolationist form, emphasizing Japanese
homogeneity over pan-Asianism.150
Studies of Manchukuo tend to focus on the disconnect present between the rhetoric and
actions of the Japanese running the state. One problem that came about was the lack of a
nationality law, a cornerstone of the modern state. Japan instead relied on its system of familial
registration with cultural connotation associated with the Japanese Imperial System. In
Manchukuo this allowed for separate judicial systems that Japanese bureaucrats were able to
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mold into acceptable forms. Koreans found these forms of imperial association especially
offensive given the other forms of cultural erasure undertaken by the Japanese in Korea.
The Japanese had profited from the vague legal status held by their Korean subjects in
Kando. Treaties were twisted and new lines were drawn over existing maps as the Japanese took
advantage of Chinese diplomatic weakness. Although this system gave Koreans certain
privileges over Manchurian locals, it also created a system in which the Koreans were
guaranteed few rights and Japanese intervention in the lives happened often. Police were placed
in Kando and Manchuria to help suppress anti-Japanese activity while Chinese authorities
became increasingly skeptical of Koreans such that they, like Japan, began a program of heavyhanded assimilation. Japan in some cases ignored the Koreans who had already naturalized their
guaranteed rights as Chinese citizens. The same thing happened to all Han, Manchu, Russians
and others in Manchuria in 1932 when they lost their respective statehood only to have it
replaced with ‘Manchurian residency’ organized around their nations of origin.
Koreans, from Kando to Manchukuo, perhaps offer the best lens with which to analyze
ethnicity as understand in the “pan-Asian” Co-Prosperity Sphere established by Japan. Given the
extent to which Japan undertook attempts at assimilating the Koreans, their position overlaps
with so many important ideas and moments in understanding racial polity in the Empire of Japan.
Mainstream pan-Asian rhetoric in Japan, however, was not founded on attitudes of
multiculturalism or with goals of ethnic intermixing. The ideology relied on Confucian
philosophy to establish a “natural and harmonious” racial hierarchy in East Asia that allowed the
military to justify its harsh policies through the puppet-emperor. Instead of creating a moral
order based on an ethnic harmony, these forms of Imperial Japanese propaganda allowed for the
construction of an exploitative power structure that always placed Japanese interests first.
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